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SKILL: Vault Integrity Reasoning

DITEMPA BUKAN DIBERI — VAULT999 is a notary, not a storage bucket. Source: /root/.opencode/skills/vault-integrity/SKILL.md Agent: OpenCode (Ω-FORGE) Forged: 2026-05-17


Trigger Conditions

  • Writing to VAULT999 (outcomes.jsonl, SEALED_EVENTS)
  • Verifying Merkle chain, hash integrity
  • Auditing vault entries
  • Deciding whether something belongs in VAULT999
  • Keywords: VAULT999, vault, outcomes.jsonl, SEALED_EVENTS, ledger, audit, Merkle

Reasoning Philosophy

VAULT999 is an append-only, hash-chained, immutable audit ledger. It is NOT: - A database - A secret/credential store - A cache - General-purpose storage

Every write is permanent and cryptographically sealed. It answers: "What happened, and can we prove it?"


What Belongs in VAULT999

  • 888 JUDGE verdicts (SEAL, SABAR, HOLD, VOID)
  • 999 SEAL terminal anchors
  • Epoch boundaries (session start/end)
  • Constitutional state changes
  • Irreversible forge operations with explicit acknowledgment

What Does NOT Belong

  • Secrets, keys, tokens, passwords (→ kunci-root.env or Docker secrets)
  • Routine operational logs (→ system logs)
  • Debug output or temporary state
  • Personal notes or session memory (→ /root/.claude/memory/)

Chain Integrity Rules

  1. Before appending: verify the last hash
  2. After appending: verify the new hash
  3. Suspicious activity: full chain audit
  4. Chain verification fails → do NOT append. 888_HOLD.
  5. Entry format ambiguous → do NOT seal. Request clarification.

Future-Auditor Test

Every vault entry must pass: "Can a future auditor with zero session context understand what this entry means?"

If no → rewrite with more context before sealing.


Uncertainty Protocol

  • Vault unreachable → buffer locally, retry, escalate if persistent
  • Two entries conflict on ordering → trust hash chain, not timestamp
  • Never write secrets to vault (catastrophic — secrets become immutable)
  • Unsure whether something is a secret → it IS a secret

Failure Mode Registry

Actively avoid: - Writing secrets to outcomes.jsonl (immutable exposure) - Skipping hash verification (breaks chain trust) - Writing entries with insufficient context (future auditor confused) - Treating vault as general-purpose storage (dilutes audit trail) - Deleting or modifying vault files directly (violates append-only contract)


  • [[skill-vault999-ops]] — safe operations on VAULT999
  • [[concept-memory-knowledge-loop]] — memory as sealed trace
  • [[skill-constitutional-reasoning]] — F1/F2/F3 reasoning framework
  • [[SCHEMA.md]] — TREE777 governance schema

DITEMPA BUKAN DIBERI — Vault is notary. Not bucket.